

# HANNO FOERSTER

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## Placement Officer:

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## Research Interests

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Primary     Labor Economics  
Secondary   Family Economics, Applied Microeconometrics

## Education

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since 2013     UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM  
                  PhD in Economics, *expected June 2019*

Fall 2016     UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON  
                  Visiting PhD Student (Hosted by Eric French)

2011-2013     UNIVERSITY OF BONN, GERMANY  
                  M.Sc. in Economics

2011-2012     UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY  
                  Visiting Student to the PhD program

2008-2011     UNIVERSITY OF BONN, GERMANY  
                  B.Sc. in Economics

## References

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Prof. Michèle Tertilt  
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Prof. Gerard J. van den Berg  
*University of Bristol*  
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Prof. Hans-Martin von Gaudecker  
*University of Bonn*  
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Prof. Katja M. Kaufmann  
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## Research

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### Job Market Paper

*The Impact of Post-Marital Maintenance on Dynamic Decisions and Welfare of Couples*

### Work in Progress

*A Structural Evaluation of Vacancy Referrals, Sanctions and Sickness Absence* (with Gerard J. van den Berg and Arne Uhlendorff)

*The Equilibrium Effects of Vacancy Referrals* (with Gerard J. van den Berg)

*The Effects of Job Displacement on Marriage Market Outcomes* (with Tim Obermeier and Alexander Paul)

## Academic Employment

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since 2018 UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, Prof. Michèle Tertilt, Research Assistant

Summer 2016 UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, Prof. Katja M. Kaufmann, Research Assistant

2009 - 2011 UNIVERSITY OF BONN, Prof. Klaus Sandmann, Student Assistant

Spring 2010 ZEW MANNHEIM, International Finance and Financial Management, Research Intern

## Teaching Experience

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Spring 2017 Introductory Econometrics (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Markus Frölich, University of Mannheim

Fall 2014 Applied Econometrics (Master of Management, English),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Anna Raute, University of Mannheim

Spring 2013 Empirical Methods (Undergraduate, English),  
Course Instructor, University of Bonn

Fall 2012 Microeconometrics (Graduate, English),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Hans-Martin von Gaudecker, University of Bonn

Spring 2011 Introductory Statistics (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Lorens Imhof, University of Bonn

Fall 2010 Introductory Econometrics (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Jörg Breitung, University of Bonn

Spring 2010 Introductory Finance (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Klaus Sandmann, University of Bonn

Fall 2009 Organization and Management (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Matthias Kräkel, University of Bonn

## **Presentations & Workshops**

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- 2018 Society of Economics of the Household (SEHO) meeting (Paris), EEA-ESEM congress (Cologne), EALE conference (Lyon), Families and the Macroeconomy (Mannheim)
- 2017 IZA workshop on Gender and Family Economics (Bonn), IZA summer school in Labor Economics (Buch/Ammersee), Aarhus University (invited Seminar), Society of Economics of the Household (SEHO) meeting (San Diego), briq Workshop on Structural Analysis of Inequality (Bonn)
- 2016 LSE Methods Programme, Numerical Tools for Macroeconomists (London), EALE conference (Poster, Ghent), European Society for Population Economics (Berlin), EEA-ESEM congress (Geneva), Search and Matching (SAM) annual conference (Amsterdam), ZEW Summer Workshop on Structural Models and Policy Evaluation (Mannheim), University College London (PhD Seminar)
- 2015 ZEW SEEK Workshop on Policy Evaluations using Search and Matching Models (Mannheim)
- 2014 Barcelona Summer School, courses on Labor Market Outcomes (Prof. Robert Shimer) and Education Economics (Prof. Derek Neal)

## **Scholarships and Awards**

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- 2013 - 2015 PhD scholarship, German Science Foundation (DFG)
- 2011 - 2012 Fulbright travel grant
- 2011 - 2012 Scholarship, German Academic Scholarship Foundation (Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes)
- 2011 Teaching Award, University of Bonn

## **Professional Service**

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- Referee Review of Economic Studies

## **Competences**

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- Languages German (native), English (fluent), French (basic), Spanish (basic)
- Software Python, Matlab, Stata, SAS, Git, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X

### **The Impact of Post-Marital Maintenance on Dynamic Choices and Welfare of Couples (Job Market Paper)**

In many countries divorce law mandates post-marital maintenance payments (child support and alimony) to insure the lower earner in married couples against financial losses upon divorce. This paper studies how maintenance payments affect couples' intertemporal decisions and welfare. I develop a dynamic model of family labor supply, housework, savings and divorce and estimate it using Danish register data. The model captures the policy trade off between providing insurance to the lower earner, enabling couples to specialize efficiently, on the one hand, and maintaining labor supply incentives for divorcees, on the other hand. I use the estimated model to analyze counterfactual policy scenarios in which child support and alimony payments are changed. The welfare maximizing maintenance policy is to triple child support payments and reduce alimony by 12.5% relative to the Danish status quo. Switching to the welfare maximizing policy makes men worse off, but comparisons to a hypothetical first best scenario reveal that there is scope for pareto improvements, pointing towards a role for more innovative maintenance policies.

### **The Equilibrium Effects of Vacancy Referrals**

*(with Gerard J. van den Berg)*

In many countries public employment services send out job vacancy referrals (VRs) to bring together unemployed workers and firms who otherwise would not have matched. It has been documented that VRs have positive effects on individual reemployment probabilities. However, the impact of VRs on the unemployment rate depends on equilibrium effects that arise, e.g., from crowding out in the hiring process. This paper studies the effect of VRs on the unemployment rate in the presence of equilibrium effects. We develop a search and matching model with multiple applications and VRs that accounts for crowding out effects in the hiring process. A VR increases the reemployment probability of the job searcher receiving it, but incurs a negative externality on all other job searchers. We estimate our model using data from a German firm survey about the hiring process as well as survey data on the job search behavior of German unemployed workers. The estimated model is used to simulate counterfactual changes in the VR rate and analyze to what extent the positive individual level effects of VRs carry through to the aggregate.

### **A Structural Analysis of Vacancy Referrals with Imperfect Monitoring and Sickness Absence**

*(with Gerard J. van den Berg and Arne Uhlenborff)*

Unemployment insurance (UI) systems typically pose job search requirements that benefit recipients need to satisfy. As a common part of these requirements UI agencies make job vacancy referrals (VRs) and sanction benefit recipients who refuse to apply. However, benefit recipients can circumvent this monitoring scheme by reporting sick after receipt of a VR. This paper studies how UI systems with VRs and sanctions impact moral hazard and reemployment rates. We develop a structural job search model that incorporates VRs and sanctions. Additionally our model allows for the possibility to report sick after receipt of a VR. We estimate our model using data from German social security records that are linked to caseworker recorded data on VRs and sickness absences. We use the estimated model to simulate counterfactual policy scenarios such as changing sanction duration, sanction severeness, the VR-rate and shutting down the possibility to report sick. The most promising policy change according to our model is increasing sanction enforcement. Increasing enforcement by 20% reduces unemployment duration by 0.5 months.